Football Management

Commentary on the management of over 160 English football clubs by Dr John Beech, winner of the FSF Writer of the Year Award 2009/10 Twitter: @JohnBeech Curator of Scoop.it! Football Finance

Archive for the ‘Costs’ Category

Why I shall be especially grumpy this Saturday afternoon

Posted by John Beech on April 3, 2012

Football clubs ‘in poor financial health’” a headline on the BBC News website has just screamed (1).  Apparently “many clubs are continuing to spend too much, principally on players’ wages, as they always have done”.  What?  Surely not?  Well, OK, the said headline was in the Business section of the BBC website rather than their Sports section.

Begbies Traynor, who over the years have been Administrators of Chester City, Kingstonian, Lincoln City, Huddersfield Town, Northwich Victoria, Wrexham, Farnborough Town, Crawley Town, Scarborough, Bournemouth, Halifax Town, Southampton, and now Port Vale, have just completed a survey looking at the finances of Football League clubs.

Beneath the trite headline, there was some detail of interest.

Of 68 teams surveyed in those divisions, 13 have signs of distress such as serious court actions against them, including winding-up petitions, late filing of accounts and “serious” negative balances on their balance sheets.

That 19% compares to just 1% in the wider economy, the firm said.

In particular “the financially distressed clubs include three in the Championship, six in League One and four in League Two.”  Obviously the survey had been completed under conditions of confidentiality, so we can only speculate on which these thirteen clubs might be that are under short-term financial pressure, a temptation which I will resist, at least publically.

There are also the clubs which, to me, have potentially longer-term pressures because they operate on business models which may not be sustainable.  Two which have caught my eye with their recent publication of financial results are one likely to be relegated to the Championship, Wigan, and one about to be promoted out of the Football League, Southampton.

At Wigan (2), turnover was reported as up 16% on the previous year, although this, it was conceded, was “mainly due to the increased Premier League broadcasting rights contract”.   Worryingly though, net losses had risen from £4m to £7.2m.

Wigan fans might take some comfort from the fact that:

Net debt including bank borrowings and loans from David Whelan and his family remained virtually unchanged at £72.2m compared with £72.6m in the previous year Since the year end £48m of debt was converted to equity which significantly reduces the Club’s long term liabilities.

Chief Executive Jonathan Jackson commented:

This position would not have been possible without the continued financial support of Chairman, David Whelan. The post year end conversion of debt to equity has significantly strengthened the Club’s financial position and has, to a very significant extent, written off the debt owed to Mr Whelan.  The club cannot continue to make losses every year and we are continuing to shape all aspects of the Club to ensure the long term future remains positive both on and off the pitch.

Perhaps just a hint there that Mr Whelan’s pockets are not bottomless.  It was he who has called for control on players’ wages (3).  It was Wigan that managed to hit a wages/revenues ratio of an utterly unsustainable 208.3% in 2004/05 (posting passim).

Meanwhile over at Southampton another ‘debt for equity’ conversion was reported last Thursday (4).  The estate of former owner Markus Liebherr had ‘invested’ £33m over two seasons but had now converted these loans into shares.  (My reason for putting single quotes around ‘invested’ is that I do not see loans as investments.  If I had pushed my credit cards to their spending limits, would I talk in terms of MasterCard and Visa investing heavily in me?).

This conversion certainly takes the financial pressure off a club which last season made a net loss of £11m in gaining promotion from League 1.

The Liebherr family seem to be in that rare group of benefactors which includes Steve Gibson at Middlesbrough – those prepared to dig into their pockets deep and for the long term.  At Middlesbrough the club is “now free from debt owed to external providers” (5).

Looking along the South Coast from the perspective of a long-suffering Pompey fan (but who is number 1 a football fan rather than a club fan), a club in deep, deep trouble not least because it is still paying some players Premier League wages as it faces the drop, my eye caught on the wages/revenues ratio at Southampton, a very high 93%.

This counter-evidence in the discourse over the financial strengths and weakness of clubs is hardly typical.  While few clubs, correction, no English clubs, are as financially distressed as Portsmouth, the Begbies Traynor report paints a more typical picture.

As Portsmouth head for Southampton this Saturday, to be ‘entertained’ as the media like to phrase it, I’ll not be building my hopes up for a surprise Pompey victory.  The earlier derby this season may have been a draw, but Portsmouth now have a depleted squad, forced upon them by their financial circumstances (and as one might well argue, not before time).  No, I’ll be quietly fuming on the absurdity that the outcome on the pitch will have been determined ultimately by the lottery of how rich and how committed your club’s benefactor has been.  It may be a football match, but it certainly is being played in a context of competitive balance.  One club has been the subject of heavy financial doping, and is paying the price, and one is the subject of financial doping, but has so far kept the ‘habit’ under control.  One is a savage indictment of the failings of the benefactor model, and the other is fortunate enough to be able to say ‘OK so far’.

If any good at all is to come out of the ‘basket case’ circumstances Portsmouth finds itself in, it will be through a new and more sustainable financial model, which is why I fully support the community share offer from the Pompey Supporters Trust.  Post-commercial era football has totally lost it way.  Clubs have become the playthings of sugar daddies, and have, as in the cases of Portsmouth and Southampton, sugar daddies with no local connection.  Ownership has become a lottery, and fans have been betrayed as a consequence.  Football governance looks as it will receive only light-touch reform, but that is insufficient to set it back on a road where the results of games are determined in a context of competitive balance.  Financial Fair Play, whatever the extent to which it will actually prove successful, is a no brainer.  And fan ownership is the only way to ensure clubs are a part of the community whose name they are happy, and proud, to identify themselves by.

This posting is, for the moment, open to comments, but please bear in mind that this is not a fans’ forum – it is a personal blog, which is happy to encourage serious debate.  Trolls will have their comments deleted, as will those who favour the so-called banter of ‘scummers’ and ‘skates’.

Posted in Benefactors, Community, Debts, Financial doping, Governance, Insolvency, Ownership, Wages | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 5 Comments »

Wages and the distortion of the pyramid

Posted by John Beech on October 30, 2011

The data just published by Sporting Intelligence (sourced from internal PFA files) adds more fuel to my argument that the football pyramid is becoming utterly distorted in the sense that the scale of finance in the different tiers is being ludicrously stretched.  In a recent public lecture as part of the  Coventry Sporting Conversation series (a podcast is available here beginning at 02:05 mins.), I put the case that the lifting of the maximum wage started to stretch the level of financial activity across the tiers, and that when the Premier League broke away and negotiated its own broadcasting rights this process accelerated dramatically.

While the Sporting Intelligence data in its tabular form excited me, it was when I put into Excel and produced some graphs that I got really excited.  The full set of data on average players’ basic wages , together with UK average wages as a benchmark is shown here:


(All graphs can be enlarged by double-clicking on them)

At first glance it is obvious that things started to change with the appearance of the Premier League, but if we plot pre-Premier League and post-Premier League separately, the change can be seen as an acceleration of the existing trend:


The most striking features of the data emerge when you compare the average basic wages over time in each tier with the average UK wages.  The Premier League data confirms the stereotype of the ability to live the Ferrari-driving playboy lifestyle:

In 1984/85 the average Premier League player was earning two-and-a-half times the average UK wage, but by 2009/10 this had grown to 34 times the average OK wage, with no sign of slowing down.

On the other hand, life for a player in today’s League 2 is rather different from this stereotype:

Starting from a position in 1984/85 of below the average UK wage, things did slowly get better until the dawn of the Premier League.  Apart from a strange positive blip in 2003/04 (and no, I can’t explain it either), his lot has been scarcely different from the average UK worker’s wage.  Given that a footballer has a limited career, I wonder how a League 2 player ever manages to get a mortgage and buy a house, especially if he’s a goalkeeper – other data I have shows that goalkeepers are the worst-paid players.

This distortion in wages up and down the pyramid is simply a reflection of the disparity in revenues.  Of course higher levels deserve higher broadcasting rights and should be able to pay higher wages to attract the best talent, but when the size of the difference between tiers has become so vast, the traditional view of a club having some ambition and a local businessman to back them has long gone.  The only way upwards to the top is with an Arab prince or a Russian oligarch.  This is of course hardly news, but the data above makes abundantly clear that unless 92 Arab princes or Russian oligarchs come along, performance on the pitch will continue to be grossly distorted by the richness or otherwise of a club’s benefactor.  That is, unless change in governance takes place, and Financial Fair Play is imposed rigorously up and down the pyramid, financial doping is stopped, and a measure of sporting competitive balance returns to the game.

Posted in Benefactors, Financial doping, Wages | Tagged: , , | 18 Comments »

The ins and outs of the transfer window

Posted by John Beech on September 3, 2011

So, the transfer window finally slammed shut, to use the mandatory cliché, amid the predictable hype.  In one respect this was hardly surprising – of the 289 August deals reported by the BBC (1), no fewer than 93, or 32%, had taken place on the final day.  In total 141 (49%) had taken place in the final week.  One was almost left wondering whether a whole month was needed.

A noticeable feature of the BBC data is that of the 289 deals, 69 involved players described as unattached, 110 were loans, and 10 were free transfers, leaving only 100 (35%) that were full-blown fee-paying transfers.  Given the main reason for having a transfer window – to prevent clubs buying in extra talent in a burst to achieve promotion or a Champions League place – the question must surely arise as to whether it is necessary to apply any transfer window at all to non-fee-paying transfers, now the clear majority.  After all, no club is going to loan another club a player willingly if it feels that will upset competitive balance and/or give the receiving club a somehow unfair advantage.

It’s difficult to analyse the spending by individual clubs – the BBC data records the figure for a mere 17 deals:

Samir Nasri Arsenal – Man City £25m
Juan Mata Valencia – Chelsea £23.5m
Bryan Ruiz Twente – Fulham £10.6m
Mikel Arteta Everton – Arsenal £10m
Peter Crouch Tottenham – Stoke £10m
Andre Santos Fenerbahce – Arsenal £6.2m
Scott Parker West Ham – Tottenham £5m
Oriol Romeu Barcelona – Chelsea £4.35m
Jermaine Beckford Everton – Leicester £3m
Emmanuel Eboue Arsenal – Galatasaray £3m
Ishmael Miller West Brom – Nottingham Forest £1.2m
Leroy Lita Middlesbrough – Swansea £1.75m
Shaun Maloney Celtic – Wigan £1m
James McClean Derry City – Sunderland £350,000
Darnel Situ Lens – Swansea £250,000
Shaun MacDonald Swansea – Bournemouth £80,000
Chris Lines Bristol Rovers – Sheffield Wednesday £50,000

There seems to be a consensus that spending has peaked again following a couple of years decline.  Which is bad news in my book.  I would have hoped that Financial Fair Play and capped squad sizes would have reined in the crazy levels of spending.  It may be that they have outside the Big 5, but that in itself is dysfunctional – these are the five clubs most likely to qualify for Europe and therefore find themselves under scrutiny from UEFA.

It’s also clear from the limited data available that there is no sign of the vertical disparity in terms of spending power  up and down the football pyramid declining.  Again, I can only greet this with disappointment.  When will they ever learn?

Posted in Costs, Globetrotterisation, Premier League, Transfers, Uncategorized | Tagged: , , , | Leave a Comment »

Substitutes and ‘cheating’

Posted by John Beech on July 21, 2011

The Football League has announced that its member clubs have voted “voted to reduce the number of substitutes that can be named on the teamsheet for matches in the npower Football League from 7 to 5” (1).  As a rationale for this change, it was stated that “This was felt to be a sensible and prudent step given the financial challenges facing many football clubs and the commitment made earlier this summer to adopt UEFA’s Financial Fair Play framework“, or, to put it another way, it’s ultimately a good way of cutting costs by employing a marginally smaller squad.

I for one would like to see a change in the rules regarding the actual substitutions allowed.  Nothing imposes such a feeling of anti-climax at the end of a tense game is the tactical (and essentially unnecessary) substitution of players as the final whistle approaches.  It has far more to do with the ‘gamesmanship’ of Stephen Potter than the gamesmanship of what used to be the Beautiful Game.

Musing on this, I turned out an early report by the Football League (but actually published in the FA Yearbook 1966-67, and hence not available online I’m afraid) called “Substitutes: An Experiment Justified“.

It begins “When the Football League introduced its Substitute Rule at the beginning of the 1965-66 season, it was received with misgivings from many people inside and outside the game.  Many of those who were against it chose to ignore the fact that substitution of players for injury has been permitted by the Laws of the Game for a good number of years”.  The second sentence came as a surprise to me.  Did substitution actually take place before 1965?  Surely in that era the culture was for a player to battle on, hiding injury in spite of the danger of exacerbating it causing permanent injury.  Think Bert Trautman.

The report continues: “There were many forecasts of the amount of cheating [sic] and misuse which would follow.  In point of fact, there has been no instance of the Substitute by a manager in order to gain a tactical advantage over his team’s opponents.”  Would that the same could be said today.

Data in the report broadly backs up the claim.  It records that 772 substitutions had been made in 2,028 League games.  These occurred during games thus:

Period of game

Substitutions

Up to 10 minutes

26

11 to 19 minutes

31

20 to 29 minutes

55

30 to 45 minutes

141

Total, first half

253

46 to 59 minutes

182

60 to 69 minutes

100

70 to 79 minutes

110

80 to 85 minutes

106

86 to 90 minutes

21

Total, second half

519

The number of substitutions in those days was limited to one, and, as the report says “If substitution is raised to two, this would increase the danger of substitutes being used tactically, which is really what everyone wants to avoid“.  Substitution was, in any case, only permitted then for injury.

Subsequently ‘everyone’ apparently stopped wanting to avoid the use of tactical substitution, and we have seen the number permitted on the bench grow to 5 in 1996 and then the about-to-be abandoned level of 7 in 2008.  Memory fails me on when tactical, i.e. for reasons other than injury, substitution was first allowed (any offers?).

Do I detect in all of this the idea that the Football League cares less about the game and its enjoyment by fans today than it did in 1965, and cares more about the costs of its member clubs?

Perhaps I’m being a little harsh.  Substitution for injury is a principle I would strongly defend, on the grounds of players’ well-being, and I wouldn’t want a return to pre-1965 practices.  It’s just that it seems to me we have gone too far with tactical substitution, something which I still want to avoid, to use the League’s phrase.

Posted in Costs, Ethics, Football League, Health & Safety, Human Resource Management, Organisational culture, Players' careers | Tagged: , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

Chester revisited

Posted by John Beech on June 28, 2011

Not a return visit to the carryings on of Stephen Vaughan, or the resurrection at the Deva, but a revisiting of the Report of the Committee on Football, aka The Chester Report, published in 1968.  With the current Select Committee report on Football Governance in preparation, it seemed timely to have look at what has and hasn’t changed since Norman Chester and his committee found when they looked at the game almost forty-five years ago – his committee was appointed in June 1966 and first met on 19 July 1966.

In this first posting I’m going to look at how the context has changed, and then, in a couple of postings spread over a couple of weeks, I’m going to focus on the similarities and the differences of then and now, and finish with some thoughts on whether we have learned any lessons.

His terms of reference are interesting: “To enquire into the state of Association Football at all levels, including the organisation, management, finance and administration, and the means by which the game may be developed for the public good; and to make recommendations”  (the emboldening is my addition).  What I find interesting is that the Committee took what we would today describe as broadly stake-holder approach.  They included looking at the game from the players’ perspective, and from that of referees and linesmen, but, although a view from the fans’ perspective is often explicit, the committee didn’t explicitly report on the state of the game from a fans perspective.  The notion of fan ownership of professional clubs was yet to emerge.

Most striking too is the financial state of the professional game at that time.  Gates had been declining since a peak shortly after the war, and professional clubs were beginning to have to come to terms with the scrapping of the maximum wage and destruction of the retain clause following the Eastham case.  The writing was on the wall that the game was going to see a flurry of wage escalation and that commercialisation would be the inevitable response, although shirt sponsorship, for example, would still be banned for almost another 15 years.

Given the generally weak state of the game, the following data is perhaps surprising.  It is in the report but its source is the 1966 PEP report on English Professional Football.

Match receipts and
Other Operating Income

Salaries, team and
admin expenses

Profit/Loss
on all matches

Profit/Loss adjusted
by Average Earnings

Division 1

£3,770,333

£3,310,667

£459,667

£47,700,000

Division 2

£1,674,333

£1,937,000

-£262,667

-£9,090,000

Division 3

£1,149,667

£1,658,000

-£508,333

-£17,600,000

Division 4

£691,667

£1,160,000

-£468,333

-£16,200,000

LEAGUE TOTAL

£7,286,000

£8,065,667

-£779,667

-£27,000,000

(The original data was for the three seasons from 1963/64 to 1965/66, which I have averaged, and the final column I have added using the MeasuringWorth.com calculator to give an idea of the profit/loss in today’s terms allowing for inflation.

‘Wealth at the top’ is still the case today, although the Premier League clubs would be happy to turn the kind of profits being turned 45 years ago, inflation adjusted or not.  There is a financial disparity between the tiers, although it was nothing like as large as today – broadcasting rights had yet to be a major factor in football.

Interestingly the disparity between levels had been growing significantly over the previous ten years, as this table from the Chester report shows:

Match receipts
1956-1966

Team and Ground Expenses
1956-1966

Division 1

+72%

+157%

Division 2

+15%

+131%

Divisions 3 and 4

+11%

+114%

The lower tiers were already failing to keep income up to a level to cover expenses even more miserably than the old Division clubs.

More to come in later postings, but interspersed with more typical postings on the current scene.

Posted in Costs, Governance, History | Tagged: , , | Leave a Comment »

A day of reckoning

Posted by John Beech on May 23, 2011

I managed to follow the great play-off between AFC Wimbledon (to whom, many congratulations) and Luton Town (to whom, commiserations) at least live online.  Football at its most exciting.  I wonder if Andy Burnham chose quite the right words though when he tweeted “Wimbledon back in Football League. Brilliant. A great victory for all football supporters over the money men. Well done to all at AFC.”  I’m sure he wasn’t referring to Luton as ‘the money men‘, although his comment would have been entirely appropriate if Wimbledon had beaten Crawley Town.

Yesterday, with the final day of Premier League games, unfortunately found me in the Tirol in a hotel room, arriving and logging on just after the games had started.  Heady stuff, and probably the most exciting afternoon in the PL all season.  As Alan Hansen was moved to write (1), “The big winner has been the Premier League itself, because this season has shown it to be the most exciting of the lot. ”  I’m not sure that I would enirely agree with his argument.

It struck me, particularly as I was feeling somewhat removed from the action, that it was distinctly odd that all the excitement was over who would or wouldn’t be relegated.  Aston Villa v. Liverpool, Everton v. Chelsea, and Fulham v. Arsenal were attracting very little attention from the twitterati.  Is this the grand scheme of things that the greedy breakaway Chairman of the old First Division envisioned some twenty years ago?  I came to the conclusion that in fact, yes, it was, had they bothered to think their plans through.  To me it is yet another symptom of what is wrong with the governance of English football.  Who is or isn’t relegated is clearly an important part of the general excitment of football, but it surely shoudn’t be the major focus.

The sacking of Ancelotti (2) because “this season’s performances have fallen short of expectations and the club feels the time is right to make this change ahead of next season’s preparations” to me provides yet more evidence of just how dysfunctional the Premier League has become.

Relegation from the Premier League undoubtedly puts serious financial pressure on a club.  When the drop in broadcasting revenues is netted off against the parachute payment, one is looking at a drop of £30m-£25m in revenues.  To this must be added a drop in matchday revenues (reduced attendance and lowered ticket prices) and a drop in merchandising sales, although these will vary from club to club, depending on the loyalty of their fans, in particular how large the core of ’till I die’ fans is.  Clubs may face a contractual drop in sponsorship fees, and may or may not have had the wisdom to include relegation clauses in their players’ contracts.  In other words, any club relegated faces a financial problem, but some may face significantly harder problems than those who had planned for the eventuality.  Clubs will also be in different states of financial health to start with.

Last week I was asked by BBC West Midlands to review the prospects for Wolves and Birmingham City should they be relegated.  On virtually every financial measure Wolves looked far more resilient to facing the drop than Birmingham City.  West Ham will undoubtedly face serious difficulties too, and only Blackppol look reasonably equipped to face the drop.

The Football League season is not quite finished, but further down the pyramid things are clearer with respect to next season.  AFC Wimbledon and Crawley Town are joining the Football league, the epitome of fan ownership and ‘benefactor’-induced financial doping respectively.  At the other end of the Conference National, it’s goodbye to Southport, Altincham (whose luck in benefitting from other clubs’ financial problems finally ran out, Eastbourne Borough, and Histon.  I’m sorry to see Eastbourne Borough go down as they were the most senior English club which is a Community Interest Company (CIC).  As an interesting aside, the Scottish Premier League may well have a CIC as a menber in the coming season – St Mirren (3).  This is a case that is well worth following, as the current owners are seeking to sell the club in a way that was  “making sure it remained sustainable and debt-free” (4).

Lower down the pyramid, the upcoming movements are plotted here.  Good to see resurrection clubs AFC Telford and Farsely on the way up.  It’s interesting to note that Ilkeston are listed as ‘reinstated’, good news for their fans following their resurrection (5), but I wonder what, for example, King’s Lynn fans or Grays Athletic fans will make of the reinstatement decision.

Finally I turn to a football story that is relevant to me in my immediate circumstances, but which does not seem to have well covered by the English-speaking  media, although due credit to Yahoo! Sport (6) for being an exception.  The story quite simply is that a major derby match between Rapid Vienna and Austria Vienna was abandoned after 26 minutes following a major pitch invasion – see here and  here.  Disturbing images that we hope we will not see moving further northwards and westwards.  After thirty minutes of disruption, the police felt unable to guarantee the safety of the players in a resumed match.  We seem to have moved onward from such dark days in England, and it was good to note the Birmingham City fans staying on at White Hart Lane to show what they had in common with Spurs fans (7).

Mind you, I suspect that “Thursday night, Channel Five” is not really going to catch on on the terraces.

Posted in Broadcasting rights, Costs, Economic impact, Fans, Football Conference, Governance, Merchandising, Premier League, Promotion, Pyramid movement, Relegation, Revenues, Sponsorship | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , , , | 2 Comments »

A fish rots from the head down

Posted by John Beech on February 4, 2011

Watching the transfer window lurch to its conclusion has not been an edifying experience – I didn’t have high expectations mind you, and my thoughts were possibly coloured by the constantly breaking internet connection at the hotel in Central Europe where I am staying.

Certainly I was slightly surprised to read last Friday, from my position of intermittent ignorance, that Premier League spending had been “restrained” (1) according to Deloitte.  This of course was before the surreal outbreak of activity which saw Torres transferred to Chelsea for some opaque figure, possibly with as high a valuation as £70m (2), and Carroll transferred to Liverpool for £35m (3).  These transfers certainly helped to restore the inflationary trend of the past few years (4).  While an argument can be made in defence of Liverpool’s position, it is not encouraging to find Alan Pardew ‘vowing’ (I hate the word, but am clearly out of line with most journalists) to spend all the money on new players (5).  Much less encouraging was the report in The Times of India that the Torres transfer had been personally funded by Roman Abramovich (6), this at a club that is ‘strong’ despite losses of £70m (7).

Where does all this leave Financial Fair Play and an end to financial doping?  Well, UEFA apparently seem unconcerned, stating that they have “full confidence that the clubs are increasingly aware of the nature of the financial fair play rules, which aim to encourage clubs to balance their incomes and expenses over a period of time covering 4-6 transfer windows” (8).  I can’t honestly say that I share that level of confidence.  It seems to me that some clubs are pushing spending to the limit and are making no attempt to keep the spirit of financial fair play.

The continuing lack of restraint the top of the pyramid simply continues to stretch the vertical integrity of the football pyramid.  The guaranteed payments by the respective leagues show the increasing distortion.  A Premier League club is guaranteed a payment of at least £41m, a Championship club receives just under £5m, and a League 1 club £1m.  No wonder that ‘ambition’ pushes lower level clubs to unsustainable levels of expenditure.  Breaking point has been reached in some cases and is nearby in others.  A cull through my intermittent bookmarks of the last ten days highlights a few cases:

  • Clevedon Town
    The club is facing a mass exodus of players because of their worrying financial situation (9), exacerbated by Jack Frost.
  • Histon
    The club was recently visited by the bailiffs, although was apparently “all just a misunderstanding” (10).
  • Kidderminster Harriers
    An on/off deal to save the club is, as I write, off, and players are unpaid (11).
  • Leyton FC
    The club has been forced to withdraw from the Isthmian League Division 1 North mid-season (12).
  • Plymouth Argyle
    The club is now dependent on survival on funding finally turning up from its absentee Japanese investors (13).  Under threat from HMRC and with other debts, the future of the club is by no means certain.
  • Welling United
    The club has faced allegations that players wages have not been paid on time (14).
  • Windsor and Eton
    A sad case this – the club was in no position to contest a winding up petition from HMRC (15) and is now no more (although there is talk already of a resurrection club).  Whatever criticism may be levelled at the club’s directors, it is difficult to disagree with President Barry Davies’s assertion that “Not enough money in football these days filters down.

It’s the minnows that are really suffering, and will continue to suffer until the highest level of football gets itself in order.

[Normal service should be resumed when I return to the comfort zone of my own wifi system in the early hours of Sunday morning.  This posting is thanks to the University of Applied Sciences in Kufstein, Tirol, Austria.]

Posted in Cashflow, Governance, HMRC, Insolvency, Premier League, Resurrection, Transfers, UEFA | Tagged: , , , , , , , | 7 Comments »

Groundhog Day for the Trotters?

Posted by John Beech on November 12, 2010

Reading through my Bolton file certainly makes for consistent reading, although ‘consistently inconsistent’ might be more accurate.

We have to balance the books” he told us as far back as 2003 (1), adding “We can’t afford to spend any money we haven’t got. We’re not going to go down that route.”  A fan of Mr Micawber then.  Unfortunately, less than a fortnight later it emerged that Burden Leisure, the parent company of Bolton Wanderers, had debts of about £38m and the wage bill had risen from £5.2m to £21.7m during the previous financial year (2).

Later that month the Bolton financial model became clear – put your faith in a benefactor (3), but not some ‘johnny foreigner’, a thoroughly pukka British benefactor, Eddie Davies, a life-long Bolton fan, who lives in, erm, the Isle of Man.  As Gartside put it, “Without Ed’s support we would be watching a very different standard of football…  We can now sit down with the banks and have serious talks about restructuring our debts.

These themes – living within your means and depending on a good old British benefactor – constitute the consistency in that regularly recur in the years since.

This week we have seen the latest Burden Leisure figures published (4) – turnover from football operations was £54.0million, which was £2.2million higher than the 2009 total of £51.8million; the retained loss for the year was £35.4million; and the cost of retaining existing players resulted in the cost of wages increasing by 14% in the year to a total of £46.4 million from the 2009 total of £40.9million.

No wonder then that one of Gartside’s favourite themes of late has been the need for a salaries cap in the Premier League.  Bolton have certainly been one of the better behaved clubs in this respect, managing to keep wages/revenues at under 60% from 2004/05 to 2008/09 (see table here), an achievement shared only by Manchester United, Tottenham, Arsenal and Liverpool.

So ‘where is the inconsistency?’ you ask.  The calls for restraint on wages and keeping within ones income are fine and deserve to be more widely supported.  The living on debt mountain sustained by a rich benefactor are not – they are forms of financial doping, attempting to disrupt competitive balance by the use of unearned money.  The inconsistency is beautifully expressed by Gartside himself, suggesting that UEFA’s Financial Fair Play protocol is not quite what is wanted: “There are ways of tweaking it that would suit the English game better.  Owners should be allowed to invest in equity.  So if you, as an owner, want to buy a striker for 10 million (pounds) that shouldn’t be a problem. But what you then can’t do is pay him extortionate wages that take you out of the breakeven situation.”  His logic is one that escapes me.

Posted in Costs, Debts, Ethics, UEFA, Wages | Tagged: , , , , | 2 Comments »

Liverpool and Manchester United

Posted by John Beech on October 14, 2010

I’ve been abroad for work and then taken a couple of days leave – the net result is a week of only occasional internet contact.  A week is a long time in football it would seem.

All my standard searches to keep up with football management affairs have resulted in a total overkill on the Liverpool sale soap.  Certainly it’s a fast-moving and ever-changing saga – I was interviewed on BBC News 24 this morning, and already there has been a development, oh, and a non-development.

It strikes me that the focus on Liverpool, understandable though it is, has meant that some very interesting football management stories have been largely ignored.  For example, there are stadium stories at Bristol City and Worcester City, not to mention the 2012 stadium confrontation, and the Portsmouth CVA and Sheffield Wednesday’s plight should definitely not be ignored.  I hope to blog on at least some of these shortly.

The oddest of largely ignored stories is, to me, the reporting of Manchester United’s financial results (1).

The club has certainly done stunningly well in terms of growing revenues and turning a profit.  Turnover is more than twice that of cross-city rivals Manchester City.  Wages have risen, but the wages/revenues ratio remains just a vague aspiration for most clubs.

All very commendable, but there is the other side to the coin – an £83.6million loss and overall debts of £521.7million.  For all the success with growing revenues, debt management has been rather less successful. Given all the legitimate concerns of United fans regarding the Glazers, there is still room for a glance at Liverpool and the thought that things could be distinctly worse.  The difference between the club’s financial positions is nevertheless not so great, even if the relatively small difference leads to quite different outcomes.  Highly leveraged debt leaves a club worryingly exposed.

In the way that we are running out of ‘benefactors’ with deep enough pockets, we are also running out of ‘investors’ with sufficient finds of their own to invest.  Clubs seem to be convinced that the scenario at Portsmouth could never possibly happen to them.  First Portsmouth, now Liverpool.  Just how many Premier League clubs to teeter on the brink will it take before Chairmen get a grip on club finances, before they take Mr McCawber’s advice.  Unless spending is reined in to the extent that the business model becomes sustainable, we live in danger ultimately of only having a weekly exhibition match between Mansouri City and Abramovich Globetrotters to tune in and watch.

Meanwhile back at Liverpool, or rather at court rooms around the world…

Posted in Costs, Debts, Investors, Ownership, Revenues | Tagged: , , , , | 5 Comments »

Manchester City following in Pompey’s footsteps

Posted by John Beech on October 2, 2010

Manchester City’s financial results, published earlier this week (1), were generally reported uncritically earlier this week, notwithstanding the key loss of £121m, with the exception at least of The Sun (2), where there was some attempt to look beyond the positive headlining provided by the club.

According to the club, the financial highlights could be summarised in large font size thus:

We have reported revenues in excess of £100m with a 44% rise in turnover to £125.1m…
Corporate partnership revenue increasing by £25.9m to £32.4m…
Ticket revenues increasing by £2.8m (18.6%) to £18.2m…
Season ticket revenues up by £0.9m to £9.6m…
Television rights fee income increasing by £5.7m (11.8%) to £54m…
Matchday hospitality revenue growing by 0.7m (13%) to £6.1m…
Retail sales and merchandising revenue increasing by £2.9m (60%) to £7.9m

Excellent news indeed, but then we find in much smaller font size that the club is report ing a net loss (and there was me beginning to think they had forgotten about costs) of £121.3m. Apparently “there have been significant increases in both player and non-player wage costs which have only been partially offset by substantial growth in the club’s commercial and other revenues

Or to put it another way, the club itself can’t afford the players but its benefactor can.  Search the report for the word ‘debts’ and you will be out of luck however.  Sheikh Mansour is following the Abramovich route and converting debts to equity, and on a scale that invites comparison with Chelsea:

The financial foundations upon which the Club operates have been strengthened with the conversion into equity of £304.9m in shareholder loans.  A further £135.8m of new equity was issued during the financial year and post year-end a further £53.2m of new equity was issued. As we continue to invest in all areas of the Club, we do so virtually debt free – with only £36m of long term commercial bank debt following the conversion of shareholder loans into equity during the year.

So, there you have it – well over £400m injected with a loss of £100m.  Not quite so encouraging then.

In the smaller print financial data towards the back of the report we find that the aggregate payroll costs have risen from £82.6m to a rather worrying £133.3m – or, as the club like to present data, a rise of 61%.  Turnover had risen from £87m to £125m, meaning that the wages/revenues ratio had risen from 94.9% to 106.6%.

Which is where the reference to Portsmouth comes in.  Deloitte point out that for the Premier League clubs en masse the wages /revenues ratio has risen to a worrying 67% (3), but this rather hides the variance individual clubs have.  Here are the ratios over five seasons:

04/05 05/06 06/07 07/08 08/09

5 seasons’
Average

Ratio for
whole
5 seasons

Manchester Utd. 48.3 50.9 43.5 47.1 44.2 46.8 46.4
Tottenham 47.0 54.8 42.5 46.7 55.4 49.3 49.2
Arsenal 57.4 62.4 50.5 48.4 46.4 53.0 51.7
Liverpool 52.5 56.6 57.9 55.1 58.0 56.0 56.2
Bolton 47.9 52.1 60.2 66.1 68.9 59.0 59.4
Everton 51.4 63.6 74.7 58.8 61.6 62.0 61.5
Middlesbrough 55.7 n/a 79.6 72.5 58.7 66.6 66.0
Sunderland 64.0 44.1 90.1 58.3 76.7 66.6 65.6
West Bromwich 57.4 57.3 73.4 79.9 65.4 66.7 65.4
Manchester City 61.9 55.6 63.9 65.9 94.9 68.4 70.3
Newcastle Utd. 57.7 62.8 65.1 78.6 85.2 69.9 70.2
West Ham Utd. 63.7 51.9 75.8 79.7 91.1 72.4 74.7
Aston Villa 64.2 78.1 81.9 66.7 83.7 74.9 75.2
Chelsea 73.1 74.6 69.7 80.6 80.1 75.6 76.0
Hull City 57.3 61.7 76.7 129.0 65.8 78.1 74.0
Fulham 85.8 80.4 88.6 73.3 69.0 79.4 77.9
Blackburn 75.8 76.9 84.8 70.3 90.6 79.7 79.5
Stoke City 65.2 88.6 88.1 105.9 55.6 80.7 68.6
Portsmouth 69.5 66.0 89.6 76.4 108.8 82.1 83.9
Wigan Athletic 208.3 58.3 100.3 88.3 89.9 109.0 87.5

[Developed from data in Appendix 7 of Deloitte (2010); annual values of over 100% highlighted]

Only five clubs have been operating within the 60% limit generally advocated as good practice.  These include three of the so-called ‘big four’ of English football (Arsenal, Liverpool and Manchester United, but not Chelsea), who have the highest wages and revenues, thus skewing the average for the whole league.  Just over half the clubs have wages. revenues ratios of over 70%, with worst practice at Wigan Athletic, with a five-seasons ratio of 87.5%.  Among the data are some particularly worrying examples of ratios above 100% – Wigan with 100.3% in season 2006/07, Stoke with 105.9% in 2007/08, Portsmouth with 108.8% in 2008/09, Hull with 129.0% in 2007/08, and Wigan again with an amazing 208.3% in 2004/05.

Such figures are clearly unsustainable without the ‘bankrolling’ of a benefactor, and by any interpretation constitute financial doping.

[Normal service should now have been resumed.  I've moved office and buildings, and largely unpacked.  My laptop has been sorted with a new hard drive - all data recovered, but still some non-standard software to install.  Fingers crossed, and on a new back-up schedule!]

Posted in Benefactors, Costs, Debts, Ownership | Tagged: , , , | 10 Comments »

Transfer torpor

Posted by John Beech on September 7, 2010

The transfer window just isn’t what it used to be.  I found myself habitually clicking to find the latest news from the BBC website and checking Twitter, but there just wasn’t much happening.  Even on the final day, there wasn’t much action to follow, unless you are a Stoke City, Spurs or Sunderland fan.

As luck would have it, I’m in the middle of moving my office across campus (hence the paucity of postings in the last week), and in the general turning out I happened across a printout from the BBC dated 22 Jan 2008 (the online version is here).  “January transfers set new record” it proclaimed.  £93m had been spent, with Chelsea the biggest spenders – £15m on Anelka and £9m on Ivanovic.  On the last day of that particular window Portsmouth signed Defoe from Spurs, and Middlesbrough splashed out £12m on Alves (1).  It all seems a long time ago.

Quite simply, this transfer window there were fewer transfers, with a propensity for not disclosing the value of the transfer fee, but many more loans.

USA Today declared that “Football’s transfer windows are a bore” (2), but was perhaps a little tongue in cheek as the report also advised “Rule No.1 of the transfer window: Believe little or nothing of what you read in the newspapers.”  As Bloomberg pointed out, England was not alone with its inactivity – in France, Germany and Spain gross spending during the transfer window was down by about 40 percent on last season (3).

I would suggest there are three causes for this downturn: the general economic downturn, an imposed discipline as we approach the Financial Fair Play protocol (although Manchester City don’t seem too worried by this) and the enforced reduction in squad size.  It is the latter that has triggered the growth in loans, with everyone a winner, unless the loanee is suddenly recalled.  The market for loan players is certainly becoming highly competitive, and there is at least a suggestion that competitive balance is being distorted by the influx of Premier League players into the Championship, the loan of Craig Bellamy to Cardiff City attracting particular comment – Burnley Chief Executive Paul Fletcher has called for a review by the Football League into loan movements between Premier League and Championship clubs (4).  The strange rule that which allows English clubs to borrow only two players from within the UK, but an unlimited number from abroad, has come under criticism from West Ham’s David Sullivan (5).

The basic argument for having transfer windows holds good – a way of ensuring some stability in a squad without the constant fear of players being lured away – so I can’t see a return to the bad old days.  For the immediate future though, it looks set to be much less exciting than it used to be.

Posted in Transfers | Tagged: | Leave a Comment »

The inevitable tension surfacing…

Posted by John Beech on August 20, 2010

Although there is always a tension between, on the one hand, the needs of a club from a footballing perspective, exemplified perhaps by the views of the manager, and, on the other hand, the needs of a club from a business perspective, it is inevitable that the tension will be greatest when a) clubs are facing financial pressures and b) the end of the transfer window is beckoning.

In the last week or so, the tension has been manifest at some clubs (in alphabetical order):

Aston Villa
Although Chairman Randy Lerner, a ‘good benefactor’ in my book, has been guarded in his comments on why Martin O’Neill has left, he has said “I can say only that we no longer shared a common view as to how to move forward. To deal in greater detail would do little but cause additional distraction for the club as it faces imminent games and the clear priority of hiring a permanent manager.  Finally, there have been no changes in our approach to building the club, aiming always to be as competitive as possible given our size and resources” (1).  I’m sure I’m not alone in thinking that the clue lies in the last phrase – an expression of ‘cutting our cloth’.

Cardiff City
Given the transfer embargoes, it’s hardly surprising that manager Dave Jones should be anxious to add to his squad (2).  It’s equally unsurprising that, with the massive Langston debt, the board take a more constrained view.  Even allowing for the clearance by the Football League of the Bellamy deal, additions have tended to feature loan deals.

Hartlepool United
Yesterday Chris Turner quit as Director of Sport (3).  He is quoted as saying “You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to work out what could happen if we haven’t improved much from the squad that only just stayed up last season and other teams have strengthened… Whether we will be able to get any more people in, you will have to ask the owners” (4).

Histon
Manager John Beck is today reported as leaving ‘beleagured’ Histon (5).  Chairman Russell Hands explained “It was a difference of opinion.  We couldn’t give him what he needed to do the job. Because of the financial restrictions we’re under he found it very, very difficult…In the end John felt that he had got as far as he could and in the interests of both parties we decided to go our own ways“.

Ipswich Town
Here, Roy Keane said today “We’re doing a lot of talking but supporters don’t want to hear that, they want to see players coming in.  We’ve been close but getting close to signing a player is no good… You’ve got to get the deals done.  We’ve been in talks and more talks and more talks. We’ve had players lined up 12 weeks ago who wanted to sign for Ipswich and they weren’t done” (6).  In spite of the backing of Marcus Evans, it would seem that there are constraints on spending.

There are certainly others that could be added to the list; please feel free to contribute other examples.

What is noticeable, apart from the general theme of frustrated ambition for the club, is the range of levels of the clubs, and the varying degrees of financial troubles they face.

It will be interesting to see how quickly O’Neill and Beck take to reappear.  They should be respected for having the conviction to vote with their feet, but their ambition may prove an impediment when facing the owners of a different club across the interview table.  O’Neill in particular has undoubted talents as a manager, but has he revealed his Achilles heel to an employer?  There are still clubs out there apparently committed to financial doping, at least while funds last and the Financial Fair Play protocol remains unaddressed, but increasingly owners seem to be opting for realism over ambition.

Posted in Costs, Organisational culture | Tagged: , | 3 Comments »

The trouble with new stadiums 4 (and final)

Posted by John Beech on August 10, 2010

[See also The trouble with new stadiums 1, which looked at the argument that "We’re a club with ambition and we need more seats to reflect that ambition", The trouble with new stadiums 2, which looked at the argument that "We’ve got the wrong sort of stadium.  We need one better suited to maximising our revenue streams.", and The trouble with new stadiums 3 which looked at the argument "There’s this amazing property deal we can do. We’ll sell the old stadium for redevelopment and there’ll be loads of money to build the new one.".]

This final posting in the series looks at whether there are cases where a new stadium can be justified, and begins with a look at Premier League clubs, for it is at this level one might expect to find any evidence that a new stadium has been a successful strategy – it is these clubs which have the highest revenues and which should thus be in the strongest financial position to finance a new stadium.

First, the big 4.  Of these, only Arsenal have opted for a new stadium, Chelsea and Manchester United having opted for stadium redevelopment, and in Manchester United’s case considerable expansion of seating capacity.  Arsenal have made a reasonable success of the new stadium, the only significant qualification being the downturn in the property market which has hindered the redevelopment of the old Highbury site.  Liverpool have opted for a new stadium policy – they could certainly justify an expansion of capacity – but their financial situation, with debts of £350m, doesn’t augur well for the timing of such a strategy.

Three of the big 4 have particular local rivals.  Manchester City are a rare example of “If it seems too good to be true, it may actually still be true“.  The financial deal that Manchester Council offered them was definitely a very attractive one, and they would have been fools not to have accepted.  Everton are in a similar situation to Liverpool – the sound business case for a new stadium is rather weakened by the debt level they try to go forward from.  Tottenham’s plans for a new stadium next door to the current one have got bogged down in the planning process – the government’s advisor on architecture, urban design and public space, the Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment, have objected that “an overall masterplan for the site is not evident: the three components – the stadium, supermarket, and housing – feel like very separate projects without convincing spatial relationships between them” (2).

Overall the situation in the Premier League

  • The clubs with new stadiums: Arsenal, Bolton Wanderers, Manchester City, Stoke City, Sunderland and Wigan Athletic, a total of six.  Of these, only Wigan has ‘shown ambition’, built a new stadium, and risen up the pyramid.  Notwithstanding the professed objection of their Chairman, Dave Whelan, to a ‘debt culture’ (3), the club has only once turned a profit in the last eleven years, and in its most recent accounts has long-term liabilities of just under £48m – it’s dependent on its benefactor for its continued existence.
  • Those with new stadium plans of varying seriousness and immediacy: Birmingham City, Everton, Liverpool, Tottenham Hotspur and West Ham United, a total of five.  West Ham would have fallen into the next group but for the exceptional possibility of ‘doing a Manchester City’ at the 2012 stadium.
  • The rest, who have in varying degrees redeveloped or plan to redevelop their existing stadiums: Aston Villa, Blackburn Rovers,  Blackpool, Chelsea, Everton, Manchester United, Newcastle United, West Bromwich Albion and Wolverhampton Wanderers, a total of nine.

    The evidence that building a new stadium is a sensible strategy is thus not strong even where you might expect to find it.

    In the Championship, Cardiff City, Coventry City, Hull and Preston North End have all paid a high price in opting for a new stadium.  Middlesbrough and Reading have survived a new stadium through the benefaction of Steve Gibson and John Madejski respectively.

    The decision to opt for a new stadium rather than redevelopment is of course a leap, with no in-between option.  The scale of cost does however vary.  From my own data, I estimate that the cost per seat can vary by a factor of over 10, so there may be some scope for restraint at the planning stage in order to make a planned new stadium more viable.

    Now, most fans will be tempted to put a case that their club is an exception.  “The current stadium is particularly awful/inappropriate/decrepit” (remember, I’m a Pompey fan) is a frequent lament.  I would argue that only in one group of clubs are there exceptional circumstances – clubs in exile or with a lease which cannot be renewed – but even in this case the danger is that optimism overrides realism.  It would be mean-spirited to do other than wish, for example, Brighton and Hove Albion well in the new Falmer Stadium when it opens next year, but the project does carry with it the assumption that Tony Bloom’s benefaction and committment are long-term.  I’m certainly not suggesting that there is any reason to think otherwise, merely pointing out that there is a risk associated with the development.

    There may even be a case for a very small group of clubs who may reasonably expect to be on a longer-term ascendancy through the pyramid AFC Wimbledon and FC United of Manchester are the obvious ones that spring to mind.  Even at the lower levels of the pyramid there is no reason in principle why a club on the ascendancy should not develop a realistic model to develop a new stadium.  A club to watch in this context is Runcorn Linnets, who offer a different approach to building a stadium by virtue of the fact that they are owned and operated by a Supporters Trust.  Perhaps it is the case that fans are only really realistic when they have chosen not to follow the broken benefactor model of ownership.

    Posted in Assets, Costs, Debts, Stadium | Tagged: , , , | 13 Comments »

    On the embargo front

    Posted by John Beech on August 8, 2010

    A quick look at clubs and embargoes, not exhaustive, and needing qualification for the particular circumstances of each club, and obviously subject to changing reactions to the lifting of an embargo.  It does however suggest that the impact of a transfer embargo varies enormously, making it a rather blunt instrument as a sanction.

    Accrington Stanley
    The club has finally lodged its accounts for 2008/09, showing a loss of £300,000 and debts of just over £1m (1).  The embargo, which had been reimposed at the end of June (2) has been lifted, and two defenders have been signed (3).

    Cardiff City
    The embargo has just been lifted (4) and manager Dave Jones has two signings lined up (5).  He obviously hopes for a ‘flurry of signings’ but it seems unlikely that the club’s finances will allow a great deal of activity.

    Portsmouth
    The for yesterday’s match against Coventry City gave the squad thus [click on image to enlarge]:

    By the time of kick-off there had been some updates.  Ashdown had been cleared to re-sign, and the actual bench had but four possible substitutes.  Boateng, who did not appear at the Ricoh, is up for sale, as is Utaka, but on yesterday’s performance it is hard to see the latter fetching a decent figure. Kanu is yet to agree new terms.  Don’t hold your breath for a ‘flurry of activity.  It’s still very much a case of ‘Pray Up Pompey:

    Pray Up Pompey

    Preston North End
    The transfer embargo was lifted at the end of June (6).  Trading has been constrained.

    Sheffield Wednesday
    The embargo has just been lifted (7), but again a ‘flurry of activity’ is not expected.

    Southend United
    The embargo has just been lifted (8).  Seventeen (yes, that’s seventeen) players have been signed by the newly-relegated club, which was repeatedly in court last season regarding HMRC debts, and which struggled to pay its players on time.  Double Nectar points all round then.

    Posted in Sanctions, Transfer embargo, Transfers | Tagged: , , | 2 Comments »

    Bubbling away in the background…

    Posted by John Beech on July 31, 2010

    Hidden away in last month’s budget (1) was a proposal that could be causing some concerns for football club finance directors.  Para 2.25 states:

    The Pay As You Earn (PAYE) system is a fundamental part of the UK tax system. The Government wishes to explore how it could be improved in order to reduce costs and make the system easier for employers and HMRC to administer. As an initial step, the Government intends to consult with employers and payroll providers on mechanisms that could support more frequent or real time PAYE data.

    A detailed discussion document (2), aimed at kicking off the consultation process (which is scheduled to be completed quickly, by 23 September), has just been issued, and Para 4.31 suggests that the use of real time information has the potential for:

    enhancing compliance with tax laws by using real time information to assist in tackling late or under payment of the deductions some employers make

    Late or under payment of taxes?  Football clubs?  Surely not!

    Another document , Tax consultations announced at Budget (June 2010), downloadable from the HMRC website here, introduces the consultation under the simple heading of PAYE improvement.  All this falls short of proposals in Alistair Darling’s budget (3) of March this year, aimed at “Employers that operate Pay As You Earn (PAYE) schemes to account for income tax and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) and have a history of serious non-compliance in terms of paying late or not paying“; these would have included “provisions allowing HMRC to require security in the matters that can be covered in PAYE regulations. It will also set out the new offence of failing to provide security. Similar provisions will be made for NICs through regulations using existing powers.

    The Budget does however say that (Para 2.112) “The Government will now consult on introducing a power for HMRC to require financial security where PAYE & NICs are at serious risk of non payment, rather than legislate in the upcoming Finance Bill as announced at the March 2010 Budget“, so financial security is not necessarily off the agenda

    So, because of a timely change in government, football clubs may have had a narrow escape from the prospect of having to up-front security if they already had a bad track record of payments to HMRC (too many to list, but Club round-up might include some possibles).  HMRC may well be just a tad disappointed.

    Nevertheless, HMRC may well end up with stronger powers to ensure PAYE and NICs are paid on time, a situation which too many football clubs are entirely unfamiliar with.  Certainly the days of being able to negotiate late payment of already overdue debts look to be coming to an end.

    Posted in HMRC, Politics, Wages | Tagged: , , | 4 Comments »

     
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